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# PERSIAN GULF

## REPORT

TO

## THE MAJORITY LEADER
## UNITED STATES SENATE

FROM

SENATOR JOHN GLENN

AND

SENATOR JOHN WARNER

ON

THEIR TRIP TO THE PERSIAN GULF MAY 27—JUNE 4, 1987

JUNE 17, 1987

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## LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
*Washington, DC, June 12, 1987.*

Hon. ROBERT C. BYRD,
*Majority Leader,*
*U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.*

DEAR ROBERT: This letter forwards our report to you on our recent trip to the Persian Gulf. The trip was most informative and we look forward to briefing you and Senator Dole at your earliest convenience.

We hope you and the other members will find this report helpful in assessing the situation.

Sincerely,

JOHN GLENN.
JOHN WARNER.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
*Washington, DC, June 12, 1987.*

Hon. ROBERT DOLE,
*Minority Leader,*
*U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.*

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## I. PURPOSE OF TRIP

Following the Iraqi air attack on the American frigate USS STARK in the Persian Gulf on May 17, 1987, Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd appointed a three-member Senate delegation to visit the Persian Gulf region. Headed by Senator Jim Sasser (D-TN) the delegation included Senator John Glenn (D-OH) and Senator John Warner (R-VA), both of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

As outlined in Senator Byrd's tasking letter of May 22, the purpose of the trip was to:

—Conduct an assessment of the threats to American and friendly forces in the Gulf; and to

—Conduct an assessment of options to improve cooperative security arrangements with friends and allies in the Gulf Region.

Out of respect for the Muslim Ramadan holy days a decision was made to divide the delegation into two parties. Senator Sasser was to conduct a preliminary investigation prior to the holy days with emphasis on the USS STARK attack. Senators Glenn and Warner would follow as the holy days were concluding, expanding their investigation to include visits to as many of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations as time would permit. Some planning was given to including Iraq, but this option, once in the area, appeared not viable. With this expanded itinerary, Senators Glenn and Warner further broadened the purpose of their trip to include an on-scene assessment of the political and military implications of the administration's plan to provide protection for Kuwaiti tankers scheduled for reflagging in early June as U.S. ships.

Senator Sasser has submitted a separate report on the results of his preliminary investigation; this report by Senators Glenn and Warner complements and builds on the Sasser report.

U.S. SENATE,
OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER,
*Washington, DC, May 22, 1987.*

Hon. JIM SASSER,
*U.S. Senate,*
*Washington, DC.*

DEAR JIM: In order to further your investigation into the security situation in the Persian Gulf, and in light of the wide range of nation-states and interests which are central to that situation, as well as the timing of the Ramadan holy day period beginning on Wednesday morning, May 27, 1987, I recommend a two-part itinerary.

First, I would recommend that you build an initial foundation for your security assessment by pursuing an investigation into an assessment of the threats to American forces and vessels in the Gulf, and to Kuwaiti interests and shipping by visiting both Bahrain and Kuwait, and by meeting with appropriate foreign and American official representatives in those locales. Second, I suggest that you begin your assessment of methods to improve cooperative security arrangements, with particular attention to the question of air cover, with our friends and allies, when in the Gulf region, including discussions with European allied representatives on this matter.

Since the Ramadan holy days preclude productive work with Arab governments for several days beginning on May 27th, I strongly suggest that Senators John Warner and John Glenn of your delegation conduct a follow-on visit later next week, and include in their itinerary the possibility of meetings in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, and with the Gulf Cooperation Council. Their visit would, then, serve to complement and build on your preliminary work.

I look forward to the report and recommendations of your delegation's combined assessment, and am sure that it will be of great value to the full Senate as it continues its efforts to provide for an adequate security system for our men and ships in the Persian Gulf.

Sincerely,

ROBERT C. BYRD.

## II. SCHEDULE OF OFFICIAL VISITS

*Bahrain* (29–30 May)

Shaikh Isa bin Sulman Al-Khalifa, Amir of Bahrain.

Muhammad bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Honorable Sam Zakhem, U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain.

Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, USN, Commander, Middle East Force.

Visited:

USS STARK (FFG–31)
USS STEPHEN W. GROVES (FFG–29)
USS LA SALLE (AGF–3)

*Oman* (30–31 May)

Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

General Johnny Watts (British Army, retired), former Chief of Staff, Sultan's Armed Forces.

Lieutenant General Hamed Al-Aufi, Chief of Staff, Sultan's Armed Forces.

Air Commodore Mohammed Mubarak, Deputy Commander, Sultanate of Oman Air Force.

Group Captain Chris Sprent, Director of Plans and Policy, Sultanate of Oman Air Force.

Captain John DeWinton, Chief of Staff, Sultanate of Oman Navy.

Honorable G. Granwell Montgomery, U.S. Ambassador to Oman.

*Saudi Arabia* (1 June)

Prince Saud al-Faysal Al Saud, Foreign Minister.

Major General John R. Farrington, USAF, Chief, U.S. Military Training Mission.

Colonel Jack Gray, USAF, Commander, ELF-One AWACS Detachment.

Honorable Walter L. Cutler, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

*Kuwait* (1–2 June)

Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, Crown Prince and Prime Minister.

Sheikh Sa'ud Muhammad al-'Usaymi, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

Sheikh Ali al-Khalifa al-Athbi Al-Sabah, Oil Minister.

Sheikh Salim al-Sabah al-Salim Al-Sabah, Defense Minister.

Abdullah Bishara, Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Honorable Anthony Quainton, U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait.

*United Arab Emirates* (3 June)

Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahayyan, President of the United Arab Emirates and Ruler of Abu Dhabi.

Rashid 'Abdallah 'Ali al-Nu'aymi, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

## III. STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1. *Belligerents:*
   - A. Iran:
     - Land area: 1,648,000 sq. km.
     - Population: 46,604,000
     - GDP (1984/5): $163.544 billion
   - B. Iraq:
     - Land area: 434,924 sq. km.
     - Population: 16,019,000
     - GDP (1985 est.): $22.515 billion
2. *Gulf Cooperation Council* (in alphabetical order)
   - A. Bahrain:
     - Land area: 676 sq. km.
     - Population: 422,000
     - GDP (1985 est.): $4.468 billion
   - B. Kuwait:
     - Land area: 17,818 sq. km.
     - Population: 1,771,000
     - GDP (1984/5): $21.474 billion
   - C. Oman:
     - Land area: 212,380 sq. km.
     - Population: 1,271,000
     - GDP (1985): $9.844 billion
   - D. Qatar:
     - Land area: 11,000 sq. km.
     - Population: 305,000
     - GDP (1985): $3.050 billion
   - E. Saudi Arabia:
     - Land area: 2,149,690 sq. km.
     - Population: 11,519,000
     - GDP (1985): $93.653 billion
   - F. United Arab Emirates:
     - Land area: 83,600 sq. km.
     - Population: 1,326,000
     - GDP (1984 est.): $25.742 billion

(Sources: The World Factbook 1986, CIA; Military Balance 1986-1987, International Institute for Strategic Studies)

**Middle East**

## Persian Gulf Region

## IV. BACKGROUND

*Iran-Iraq war*

On September 22, 1980, hoping to take advantage of internal disturbances in Iran, Iraq launched a strike into Iran. Although tensions between the two states had increased following the 1979 revolution in Iran, the outbreak of hostilities had historical roots in the cultural differences between Arabs and Persians. For centuries, Arabs have fought Persians with the border between Iran and Iraq being a primary source of contention. These differences are exacerbated by strong personal antagonisms between the current leaders.

In launching its September 1980 attack, Iraq apparently believed that Arabs in the Khuzistan region of Iran would rise in support of Iraq, the Iranian army would collapse, and the government in Tehran would either collapse or agree to a ceasefire. None of this occurred. Despite the advance of Iraqi troops through more than half of Khuzistan, Iran did not yield.

In a series of counterattacks beginning in September 1981, Iran forced Iraqi troops to retreat from much of the territory occupied during the previous year. In June 1982, Iraq withdrew its forces from Iran. In July 1982, Iran began to attack Iraqi territory. Since that time, Iraqi forces have been primarily defending their own territory while inflicting heavy losses on Iranian forces.

Since mid-1982, the Iran-Iraq conflict has become a war of attrition in which the line of battle has moved little more than a few miles from the pre-war border. Tactically, the Iranians have persisted in attacking, using massed infantry, but battles have not been fought to decisive conclusions. Iran apparently lacks the firepower and logistical support to effectively achieve its objectives. For its part, Iraq has adopted a defensive strategy to preserve its more limited human resources.

In the near term, it appears that the static war of attrition will continue, with neither Iran nor Iraq capable of achieving a decisive military victory over the other.

*Tanker War*

During the first 3½ years of the Iran-Iraq war, only 51 ships were attacked in the Persian Gulf. Ships struck during this period were directly involved in combat resupply. However, on March 27, 1984, Iraq escalated the air war, into what has been called the "tanker war", by attacking Iran's economic shipping and oil installations. Iraq's objectives were to prevent or reduce the importation of vital materials required by Iran for its war effort, to reduce or terminate Iran's oil revenues which help finance the war, and to internationalize the war. On May 19, 1984, the Iraqi Foreign Minister reiterated his government's intention to interdict Iranian shipping and to demonstrate to Tehran that "the elusive war of attri-

tion which they have bet on is not in their interest." Iran has retaliated—by sea and by air—by attacking the shipping of Iraq's Gulf supporters.

Since March 27, 1984, 248 ships have been attacked in the "tanker war." (Nineteen other ships have been attacked by Iraq, but these combat resupply vessels are not considered part of the "tanker war.") Iraq initiated 153 of these attacks while Iran has conducted strikes on 95 ships. Sources may differ on the exact number of attacks because of different counting methods. The rate of buildup of the number of attacks has been roughly parallel between the two nations, but the preponderance of Iraqi-initiated attacks is indicative of Iraq's aggressiveness in moving the war to a maritime dimension as a means of breaking the land war deadlock.

Despite the high number of ship attacks, the actual damage to ships has been relatively insignificant in comparison to other military actions to disrupt a maritime lifeline; a case in point is the heroic Murmansk run of World War II. Very few ships have been sunk during the "tanker war", and estimates are that oil exports from the Persian Gulf have been reduced only by less than 1 percent due to hostile action. In part, this ineffective campaign against shipping reflects the failure of both Iran and Iraq to aggressively use their military assets in this campaign. In addition, the ordnance used by both sides is ineffective in causing significant damage to oil-laden tankers.

*Gulf Cooperation Council*

As a result of developments in the Persian Gulf region during the late 1970's and early 1980's, notably the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq conflict, the six Arab states on the western and southern edges of the Persian Gulf—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman—agreed in February 1981 to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The official date of establishment was May 25, 1981. Perceiving real threats to their security, the GCC was formed to enhance prospects for security cooperation and to contend with economic and political concerns. Formation of the GCC demonstrated a readiness on the part of the six conservative, monarchial Arabian Peninsula states to put aside longstanding differences in favor of stronger coordination and mutual security.

Under a confederal structure, along the lines of the European Community, the GCC seeks to achieve a consensus among its members. In a statement issued by its General Secretariat in May 1982, the GCC stated five principal goals:

—*economic integration*, considered to be the underlying basis for all other cooperative efforts;
—*political coordination in foreign policy*, through nonalignment in international affairs and intimate involvement in Arab affairs;
—*defense cooperation;*
—*internal security;* and
—*social, cultural, and educational cooperation.*

*U.S. Forces in the Middle East*

A United States military presence in the Gulf region began in 1948 with the establishment of the U.S. Naval Forces, Persian Gulf Command. In August 1949, the small surface ship patrol force was re-named the Middle East Force (MEF). The MEF remains in place today, a continuous naval presence in the Gulf for almost 40 years.

The original purpose of the MEF was to show the flag, support U.S. relationships with regional states, provide emergency services at sea, procure and ship fuel oil, and to conduct hydrographic surveys. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War, MEF missions have expanded to include more operational tasks. Today the MEF maintains air/sea lines of communication, demonstrates U.S. resolve, conducts maritime surveillance operations, exercises with local navies, and promotes goodwill through port visits in the region.

MEF currently operates out of Bahrain's Mira Sulman pier under a leasing arrangement with the government of Bahrain. An Administrative Support Unit of 135 people performs administrative support functions for the force. There is no other comparable U.S. facility in the Gulf area.

In its early days the MEF consisted of a command ship and two combatant escort ships. In 1980 two additional escorts were added, expanding the force to a total of five ships. When there is no aircraft carrier battle group in the region, MEF may be further augmented to provide for a total force of six cruisers/destroyers/frigates and one command ship.

Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command at MacDill AFB, FL, is the Unified Commander for the Gulf region. Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, at Pearl Harbor, HI, is the Navy Component Commander and immediate superior to the Commander, Middle East Force.

*Kuwaiti requests for assistance*

Although the "tanker war" has not caused significant economic dislocations or interrupted "freedom of passage", Kuwait has come under increasing pressure from Iranian attacks. Since September 13, 1986, 25 of 30 Iranian attacks have been against Kuwaiti tankers or ships in trade with Kuwait. During November and December 1986, Kuwait began to explore options, including discussions with the Soviet Union and the United States, to provide protection for its tankers. Below is a chronology, prepared by the Department of State, of key events leading to and concerning the U.S. commitment to reflag eleven Kuwaiti tankers. Details of the means of protection are being defined.

*1986*

| | |
|---|---|
| Nov. 1 | Government of Kuwait (GOK) raises concern about shipping at Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit. |
| Dec. 10 | Kuwait Oil Tanker Co. (KOTC) requests from U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) information on U.S. flagging requirements. |
| Dec. 23 | KOTC informs U.S. Embassy of interest in reflagging. |

| | |
|---|---|
| Dec. 25 | USCG informs KOTC of reflagging requirements. |
| *1987* | |
| Jan. 12 | USCG sends KOTC reflagging information. |
| Jan. 13 | GOK asks U.S. Embassy if reflagged Kuwait-owned vessels would receive U.S. Navy protection; United States Government (USG) learns GOK has similar offer from Soviets. |
| Jan. 23 | Presidential statement reiterates commitment to free flow of oil through Strait of Hormuz and support for GCC self-defense. |
| Jan. 29 | USG reply to GOK inquiry of Jan. 13 reiterates policy commitment to Arabian Gulf; GCC must be first line of defense; Kuwait can reflag/charter if requirements are met. |
| Feb. 6 | USG affirms to Kuwaitis U.S. Navy mission to protect all U.S.-flag ships to degree possible with available assets. |
| Feb 25 | Presidential statement reiterates USG commitment to free flow of oil and GCC states' security. |
| Late Feb. | USG learns that USSR agreed to reflag/protect some Kuwaiti tankers. |
| Mar. 2 | KOTC asks to put six vessels under U.S. flag. |
| Early Mar. | USG learns that Soviets are prepared to protect five tankers under Soviet flag. |
| Mar. 7 | GOK informed of U.S. offer to protect all eleven vessels in question. |
| Mar. 10 | GOK indicates it will accept USG offer. |
| Mar. 12 | State Dept. Legislative Affairs notifies Staff Directors of the Subcommittees on Europe/Middle East of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) of USG offer to Kuwait and offers detailed briefing. |
| Mar. 17 | Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reaffirms USG offer to GOK. |
| Mar. 19 | Classified talking points on U.S./Kuwait offer delivered to SFRC and HFAC staffers. |
| Mar. 22 | KOTC/Middle East Force begin talks on protection modalities. |
| Mar. 23 | Classified talking points delivered to Senate and House Armed Services Committees staffers. |
| Mar. 26 | Informal briefing to Sen. Byrd staffer; briefings offered to Senators Byrd and Dole. |
| Mar. 30 | Assistant Secretary of State Murphy gives closed joint briefing to HFAC Subcommittees on Europe/Middle East and Arms Control/International Security/Science. |
| Mar. 31 | Murphy briefs SFRC members in closed session. |
| Apr. 2 | Kuwait formally responds to offer of Mar. 7. |
| Early Apr. | USG learns Kuwait will charter three long-haul Soviet tankers. |
| April 21 | Murphy in open testimony to HFAC Subcommittee on Europe/Middle East refers to reflagging arrangement. |

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| | |
|---|---|
| April 22 | KOTC/USCG begin talks on technical details of reflagging; first step is USCG inspection. |
| Early May | Soviet charters begin. |
| May 12 | Murphy discusses arrangements with GOK officials. |
| May 13 | USCG inspection begins in Kuwait. |
| May 13 | GOK/Middle East Force meeting on proposed system of protection. |
| May 14 | Department of Defense authorizes National Defense Waiver allowing vessels 1 year to comply with certain U.S.-specific safety requirements. |
| May 17 | USS STARK attacked. |
| May 19 | Murphy presents open testimony to HFAC Subcommittee on Europe/Middle East; closed briefing to SFRC. |
| May 19 | USCG inspections in Europe begin. |
| May 21 | Murphy presents closed briefing to HFAC Subcommittee on Europe/Middle East. |
| May 21 | First application for U.S. registry deposed at USCG, Philadelphia. |
| May 25 | Senator Sasser meet with GOK officials. |
| May 28 | President briefs Republican congressional leadership. |
| May 29 | USCG grants 1-year waiver of certain U.S.-specific safety requirements. |
| June 2 | Senators Glenn and Warner meet with GOK officials. |
| June 6 | GCC Foreign Ministers voice support for Kuwaiti efforts to protect its economic interests, reiterate adherence to United Nations Security Council resolutions on free passage of vessels using GCC ports, and appreciation for interest of international community in protecting Arabian Gulf navigation. |

*President Reagan's proposal*

In response to Kuwait's requests, President Reagan has proposed:

1. to expedite procedures for the registry of eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers under the American flag; and,

2. to provide appropriate protection by U.S. military forces (principally U.S. Navy ships) to the eleven reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers while operating in the Persian Gulf region and transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

*The attack on USS STARK*

Shortly after 10:00 p.m. local time on Sunday evening, May 17, 1987, the USS STARK was struck by two EXOCET anti-ship missiles while on patrol in the Arabian Gulf. Thirty-seven U.S. servicemen died in the attack. The remaining crew fought heroically for 18 hours to extinguish the shipboard fires and save their ship.

The attack originated 2 hours earlier when a Mirage F-1 fighter aircraft took off from a base in Iraq and flew southeast down the Gulf in a profile typical of those previously employed by the Iraqis

in attacks on shipping. The Mirage was tracked on radar by several U.S. Navy ships, including the USS STARK, and by a U.S. Air Force AWACS aircraft airborne over Saudi Arabia operating in its usual flight pattern. The Saudis are committed to providing air defense for the AWACS plane over their terrority. As the Mirage headed south, parallel to the Saudi coastline, two F-15 fighters were launched from the Saudi airbase at Dhahran.

The STARK issued two warnings by radio in English to alert the Iraqi pilot he was approaching a U.S. vessel, but there was no response. The Mirage launched two EXOCET missiles at a range of 10-25 miles from the STARK. Both missiles struck the ship on her port bow, tearing a 10 by 15-foot gash in the side.

When the AWACS crew realized the STARK had been attacked, they requested that the airborne Saudi F-15s intercept the Mirage and force it to land. Saudi ground controllers did not have authority to permit such an operation in international airspace, and before they could secure approval, the Mirage was crossing into Iraq enroute to its base.

A formal U.S. Navy Board of Inquiry is examining the circumstances of the attack on the STARK. Evidence to date strongly suggests the attack was an accident and that the Iraqi pilot erroneously believed he was attacking an Iranian oil tanker. Within days of the attack, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger characterized the attack as a "single, horrible error on the part of the Iraqi pilot."

*The SILKWORM missile as a threat to the Strait*

During 1986, Iran began to take delivery of Chinese HY-2 "SILKWORM" coastal defense missiles. Because of their range and lethality, the SILKWORMs, if deployed, are a serious potential threat to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. For the first time, Iran has the military means to effectively close the Strait.

The SILKWORM is a land-based variant of the Soviet SS-N-2 STYX missile, originally developed for shipboard launch during the late 1950's. Performance of the Chinese SILKWORM is assumed to be similar to that of the Soviet version. The missile has a range of about 50 nautical miles, carries an 1,100 pound warhead (three times that of the EXOCET) and attacks in a sea-skimming trajectory at high sub-sonic speed. Because of its very large warhead, the SILKWORM is fully capable of sinking both cruiser/destroyer size warships and large commercial tankers.

While the Iranian SILKWORMs are not yet operational, at least two launch sites are being prepared overlooking the Strait of Hormuz. These sites will allow the Iranian SILKWORMs to put shipping at risk over the entire width of the Strait.

*United Nations initiative*

The United States has taken the initiative in the United Nations Security Council to seek effective international pressure for an end to the Iran-Iraq war. The United States is currently working with the other permanent Security Council members to seek concurrence on a draft resolution which calls for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal to internationally-recognized boundaries. Unlike previous U.N. hortatory efforts, the U.S. proposal would contain

enforcement mechanisms against any belligerent who does not accept the resolution's conditions. To become effective, the resolution must win majority support in the Security Council, including all five permanent members. General Assembly concurrence is not required. If the Security Council approves the resolution, all U.N. members would be obligated to maintain the sanctions provision. However, there are no concrete means for calling to account members who violate the arms embargo. The State Department is hopeful about the prospects for agreement on this approach.

## V. FINDINGS

*U.S./Western vital interest in Gulf oil*

The United States currently imports from the Gulf region 7 percent of its total oil consumption, Western Europe imports 30 percent of their needs and Japan 65 percent. By volume, the United States is second only to Japan in oil imports from the Gulf region; for 1986 the United States averaged .9 million barrels per day in Gulf imports. Oil from Gulf states leaves the area either by tankers through the Strait of Hormuz or pipelines to various Red Sea and Mediterranean ports. It is estimated the Gulf region contains between 50 and 60 percent of the world's proven crude oil reserves. Western dependence on Gulf oil is projected to grow throughout this century. (See Appendix A for further data on U.S./Western dependence on Gulf oil.)

*U.S. credibility in region has suffered*

U.S. credibility in the Gulf region has been damaged by various policy setbacks, reversals, and inconsistencies since the fall of the Shah of Iran. Most often mentioned was the sale by the United States of arms and spare parts to Iran while proclaiming a public posture opposing such sales. The U.S. pull-out from Beirut following the terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks also raised questions regarding a commitment to a geographic area the United States has proclaimed as a "vital" interest. Furthermore, at least one Foreign Minister suggested that the United States is acquiring a reputation as an undependable arms supplier, particularly when the Congress is involved. Finally, although not frequently addressed, our ill-fated support for the Shah, the prolonged hostage situation following, and the tragic outcome of Desert One continue to evoke doubts over U.S. diplomatic and military competence.

In the face of this track record, the Gulf nations are reluctant to embrace the U.S. current representation as their protector in the region. The total native population of the GCC states is barely one-ninth that of Iran. (Even when non-residents and expatriates are included, GCC states total only one-fourth of Iran's population.) The Gulf states are concerned that the United States might expand its military presence in the area, antagonize Iran, and then depart, following a pattern in Lebanon when confronted with prolonged adversity, leaving the Gulf states to face the wrath of Iran. This concern was accentuated by Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati's visit to several of the Gulf states during our trip.

It should be noted that in questioning the "staying power" of the United States, several officials, in a very diplomatic, sophisticated way, specifically questioned the willingness of the Congress to make or keep a long-term commitment. In general, the leaders we met were intelligent observers of our system of government.

*Limited economic impact of tanker war*

The economic impact of the tanker war has been minimal. Less than 1 percent of Gulf shipping has been interdicted by the attacks at an annual loss of approximately $150 million, a figure described by one Foreign Minister as "within our ability to absorb". Very few vessels have been sunk as a direct result of an attack, and the ship repair business is thriving. Insurance rates, which peaked shortly after the attacks began, have now subsided, and in some cases the largest vessels now transit the Strait of Hormuz without any special insurance at all. There is an ample supply of tankers, no shortage of seamen willing to man them, and an atmosphere of "business as usual".

For Kuwait, however, the picture is different. Since September 1986, of 30 ships attacked by the Iranians, 25 were Kuwaiti ships or ships "in trade" with Kuwait. The Iranians, unlike the Iraqis, are quite circumspect in their target selection—they positively identify vessels prior to attacking. The recent concentration on Kuwaiti shipping is not without reason. Because Iraq receives most of its seaborne Gulf cargo, including war materials, through Kuwait ports and often in Kuwaiti ships, Iran has focused its anti-shipping campaign on Kuwait. The Iranians have also applied political pressure and sponsored terrorist attacks inside Kuwait to intimidate and discourage the Kuwaitis from supporting neighboring Iraq.

*The real issue is not the 11 tankers*

Given the large volume of traffic though the Strait of Hormuz, (350–450 vessels each month) and the limited number of attacks (less than 1 percent of shipping has been interdicted in the Gulf area), it is apparent that the 11 Kuwaiti tankers proposed for reflagging and the relatively insignificant amount of oil they may carry are not the real issues.

The real issues are first, the strategic interest of the United States (and the industrialized West) in an area that holds 50 to 60 percent of the world's known petroleum reserves and second, the threat posed to that interest by the Iran/Iraq War. The "tanker war", per se, does not significantly threaten that interest—few oil tankers have been sunk and the price of oil has actually declined since the tanker war began (March 1984).

The war does, however, create instability in the region that could lead to unacceptable consequences. First, victory over Iraq could be followed by an Iranian attempt to sweep southward along the Gulf's west coast. Of the GCC states, only Saudi Arabia has the manpower and military capability to slow such an advance. Should Iran dominate the western Gulf, western economies could be held hostage to policies and pricing structures dictated by Khomeini or his fundamentalist successors.

Second, the Soviet Union may take advantage of the existing instability (and the request by Kuwait to charter Soviet vessels) to expand their influence in the region. In time, this could lead to Soviet domination of the area, although the basics of religion and capitalism create a barrier to Communism.

*If we don't help, the Soviets will*

Gulf state officials with whom we met repeatedly made clear their understanding that the Soviet Union was ready to lease the Kuwaitis tankers and protect them if the United States declined the reflagging request. Such a development would not be welcomed by all of Kuwait's GCC partners. However, while traditionally suspicious of the Soviet Union, Gulf officials seemed to understand that if help was not forthcoming from "traditional friends", Kuwait would be justified in seeking help wherever it was available. The officials further pointed out that in contrast to the Soviets' immediate and unconditional response to Kuwait's request the U.S. debate over the issue is confusing and unsettling, fueling their suspicion that the United States cannot be relied upon to fulfill its commitments to friends and its obligations as a superpower in areas it proclaims "vital" to its interests.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union's willingness to increase its Gulf presence is consistent with its stated long term strategy for the region. In a speech given in Prague in 1973, Leonid Brezhnev states:

> "Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends: the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of central and southern Africa."

Gulf leaders also cited Soviet willingness to supply arms, in contrast to prolonged uncertainties associated with U.S. sales.

*Political support among GCC for greater U.S. presence*

Political support for a greater U.S. military presence in the Gulf is not unanimous among GCC members. While some members actively and publicly proclaim their support for such a presence, others express concern over where such an increased presence might lead.

One Foreign Minister, concerned that a greater U.S. presence may trigger a confrontation that would jeopardize the free flow of oil from the Gulf (on which all GCC economies depend), advised first seeking diplomatic solutions—particularly those involving the GCC. He underscored the importance of not disrupting the oil flow by saying simply, "If we do not sell oil, we cannot drink water."

Others were more outspoken in support of an increased presence. Several stressed the importance of coming to the aid of a friend. One head of state said, "When a friend is in need and asks you for help, you must help him. Otherwise, what is the value of the friendship?" The reflagging proposal is now seen by many in the region to be a litmus test of U.S. dependability.

Virtually all with whom we met indicated that an increased presence would be acceptable only if it came without fanfare. This is consistent with the theme of having the U.S. fleet (as well as other military assets) just "over the horizon—out of sight but close enough if needed."

On balance, the GCC appears to welcome a greater U.S. presence in *private*—but is reluctant to proclaim their support in *public*. This attitude is a reflection of their culture.

*Prospects for use of GCC facilities*

A greater U.S. military presence will require the increased use of new and existing regional facilities, yet none of the officials we met were forthcoming that such facilities would be made available unconditionally. Virtually all tempered their comments by stressing the need to examine all applicable circumstances before reaching decisions.

A common theme we encountered throughout our visit was the need for the United States to make our commitment first, reestablish credibility, and then the Gulf nations would consider an appropriate response on their part. We were asked at virtually every stop, "What is *your* strategy? What is *your* commitment?"

Despite this cautious approach, several officials implied that use of facilities (and we stress "use of facilities" rather than "basing rights") would be available when needed.

*Prospects for any active military participation by GCC*

All GCC members expressed willingness to employ their defense forces as necessary to defend their own borders or territorial waters. None, however, indicated any willingness to go beyond those limits. We repeatedly asked, and they were repeatedly clear, in reply.

When asked directly whether they would authorize their forces to participate (even in a token or symbolic way) in a retaliatory strike (or "hot pursuit" of an aggressor) following an attack on a tanker or naval vessel, none volunteered. In their view, an attack outside their territorial waters is an international concern—not a domestic one—and therefore should not involve local forces. "This is the sole responsibility of superpowers!"

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

*U.S./Western vital interest in Gulf*

Oil is obviously the principal strategic ecomomic interest of the United States and the Western world in the Gulf region. Oil is our predominant energy source and that situation is not likely to change in the forseeable future. While the United States currently receives only 7 percent of its oil from the Gulf—as opposed to 30 percent for Western Europe and 65 percent for Japan—oil is a fungible commodity, so supply reductions and price increases would impact on all consumers. Focusing solely on current dependence on Gulf oil provides an incomplete picture of the region's strategic importance. The Persian Gulf region contains between 50 to 60 percent of the world's proven crude oil reserves, and these reserves are more readily available and thus cheaper to extract than other known sources. U.S. and allied reliance on Persian Gulf oil is expected to increase in the future, hence the Gulf may be expected to increase in strategic importance.

*Vital interest potentially threatened*

The very minor disruptions in oil supply currently resulting from the Iran-Iraq War, specifically the tanker war, do not pose an immediate threat to U.S. security or economic interests. There is, however, a serious risk of escalation. The continuation of the war or its widening to encompass added Iranian intimidation of Gulf states poses a real potential threat. The conflict creates uncertainty and instability. Neither a Persian Gulf controlled by a revolutionary Iran nor a Soviet presence would be in the interests of the Western world.

*Timely end to Iran/Iraq war is first priority*

Since it is the ongoing war which threatens our interests, our first priority should be, in concert with the United Nations and the Gulf Cooperation Council and our allies and Japan, to continue every effort to bring the war to an equitable termination.

*Increased U.S. Forces required for escort*

The long-standing U.S. commitment to the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz has led the administration to propose a plan to protect reflagged Kuwaiti tankers against attack in the Gulf. Prudence dictates that additional U.S. military forces will be required in the region in order to conduct this expanded escort mission and reduce risks.

*Greater support from regional states is essential*

Support of those increased forces will necessitate further essential cooperation from the Gulf states. That cooperation will in part

depend on their perception of U.S. resolve and willingness to stay the course, even in the face of adversity.

*Allies should share the burden*

Since many of our NATO allies and Japan share our interest in the Gulf region, we must also make every effort to enlist their participation, both military and economic, in developing a common strategy in the region for peace and stability.

*Need for firm, lasting commitment*

If we are to succeed, our commitment must be firm, unequivocal, and enduring. Moreover, it must be well understood and backed by the Congress.

*Only American lives at risk in retalitory strikes*

The tanker protection plan will probably rely on the threat of retaliation to deter attacks on U.S. ships. Such retaliatory strikes could take many forms, could occur in international waters or in an aggressor's territory, and would put U.S. forces at risk. Neither our allies nor the regional states have, as of the time of this report, committed to participating in such operations. We are gravely concerned with a policy of "going it alone" with U.S. forces and the potential that only U.S. servicemen might be killed or captured.

## VII. ISSUES REQUIRING FURTHER EXAMINATION

Several issues were identified that require further examination. These include:

*Likely Soviet response to U.S. reflagging/protection of Kuwaiti tankers*

The Kuwaitis have agreed to charter three Soviet tankers which the Soviets have agreed to escort. Further Soviet activities in the Gulf in response to a greater U.S. presence should be thoroughly considered. This assessment should include likely Soviet military activities (including arms sales in the region), as well as potential diplomatic initiatives.

*Likely Soviet response if U.S. decides not to flag and escort Kuwaiti tankers*

This is a critical issue which must be evaluated if any option other than U.S. flagging of the Kuwaiti tankers is considered. According to the administration, it was in part the possibility of Soviet flagging/chartering that induced the United States to volunteer to flag the Kuwaiti tankers. Moreover, it was clearly implied by senior Kuwaiti officials that should the United States fail to go through with the reflagging, Kuwait would have to "look elsewhere for help."

*Prospects for allied cooperation*

Every effort should be made to continue to involve our European allies and Japan in devising a long term strategy for western involvement in the Gulf region. Just as they share the benefits, so they should share the costs of ensuring the free flow of oil from the Gulf.

*U.S. Forces for protection of shipping*

When the Kuwaiti request for reflagging and protection was first considered, it was commonly believed the ships then assigned to the MEF (6 cruiser/destroyer/frigates) would be sufficient for the escort role. No augmentation was anticipated.

Following the attack on USS STARK, and as the Iranian SILKWORM missiles neared operational status and Iranian intentions became less clear, force requirements for the protection of shipping were revised upward. While the exact composition has not been announced, the expanded force is expected to include several additional escort ships inside the Gulf, and an aircraft carrier battle group in the North Arabian Sea to provide air cover over the Strait and southern reaches of the Gulf.

The Nation's thirteen deployable aircraft carriers already operate at a very demanding pace in order to meet commitments elsewhere. Since July 1986 the Navy has only been required to main-

tain a carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean for a minimum of 7 months of the year. If a carrier battle group is now required to remain on permanent station in the region, this will inevitably affect the world-wide carrier employment plan, training and readiness, and time in homeport between deployments.

A commitment of this magnitude raises several questions which deserve further explanation by the administration.

—Exactly what forces, including land based aircraft, will be required in order to execute the tanker protection plan at an acceptable level of risk?

—What will be the effect of such a reallocation of forces on:

—Our ability to respond to crises elsewhere?

—Training and readiness?

—Deployment schedules and time in homeport?

—Personnel retention?

—How much will the tanker protection plan cost to implement and maintain?

—How long will escorting be required to continue? Under what circumstances would it be terminated and our augmentation forces withdrawn?

—What is the impact of added commitments on people?

*Potential for a truce in the tanker war*

Both Iraq and Iran refrained from attacking commercial shipping for the first three and one half years of the war. But in April 1984, in an effect to damage Iran's economic lifeline, Iraq initiated a campaign against ships carrying Iranian oil for export. Iran, which is far more dependent on sea transport than Iraq, responded with a retaliatory campaign against ships in trade with several GCC states and, since September 1986, predominantly ships in trade with Kuwait. Most Gulf seaborne cargo bound for Iraq is actually landed in Kuwait and transported overland.

Given their dependence on the sea lanes, Iran's strategic interests would clearly be served by the restoration of safe navigation in the Gulf and the Strait. If Iraq could be persuaded to cease their anti-ship campaign, Iran would likely follow suit. Such a plan holds little appeal for Iraq, however, because their anti-ship campaign provides the Iraqis with substantial leverage in a war in which they enjoy few strategic advantages.

*Possible options available to United States other than flagging and/or providing U.S. Navy escort for Kuwaiti tankers*

Although administration officials have indicated that the decision to flag and escort the Kuwaiti tankers has already been made, the Congress should nevertheless understand the alternatives to flagging. Options suggested for further examination include but are not limited to the following:

—Economic pressure on Iran

—Pressure on Iraq to stop their tanker attacks

—Pressure on United Kingdom, France, et. al., to stop arms sales to Iran

—Pressure on all nations to stop arms sales to both Iran and Iraq

—Increased naval presence without flagging

—Provide naval escort to several nations (regardless of flag)
—Accelerate construction of pipelines to reduce dependence on Hormuz SLOC
—Conduct the operations of our naval forces in a manner that is consistent with British and French naval forces, that is, have a de facto common pattern of operations.

*Other nations may seek U.S. protection*

How will the United States respond to other nations whose ships are threatened in the Gulf should they also seek U.S. naval protection through reflagging? Such requests may come from Gulf nations or others who routinely trade with Gulf countries.

# APPENDIX A

WORLD OIL DEMAND/SUPPLY

(mbd)

| | 1985 | 1990 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Consumption | 45.6 | 50.4 - 52.6 | 53.2 - 56.8 |
| Supply from Gulf OPEC* | 10.1 | 13.6 - 14.8 | 18.3 - 20.3 |
| % from Gulf OPEC | 22.2% | 27 - 28.6% | 33 - 35.7% |

* Includes domestic consumption as well as exports

(Source: International Energy Agency, March 1987)

INTERNATIONALLY TRADED OIL

(mbd)

| | 1985 | 1987 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Internationally traded oil | 22.32 | 23.6 | 25.5-28.5 | 27.0-31.0 | 25.5-29.7 |
| % Gulf oil exports | 37% | 40% | 44% | 55-57% | 58-60% |
| % transitting Hormuz | 29% | 23% | 14-19% | 23-25% | 19-23% |

(Source: International Energy Agency, March 1987)

OIL EXPORTED THROUGH HORMUZ: PRINCIPAL MARKETS

| Market | 1974 | 1980 | 1982 | 1984 | 1986 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States: | | | | | |
| volume (mbd): | 1.0 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.8 |
| % of oil comsumption: | 6% | 10.6% | 4.6% | 3.2% | 5% |
| Western Europe: | | | | | |
| volume (mbd): | 9.0 | 6.9 | 4.3 | 2.9 | 2.9 |
| % of oil consumption: | 58.8% | 52% | 36.4% | 25.4% | 25% |
| Japan: | | | | | |
| volume (mbd): | 3.5 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.5 |
| % of oil consumption: | 71% | 60% | 55.6% | 57.8% | 60% |

NOTE: This chart depicts only that oil which transits the Strait of Hormuz.
Oil exported via pipeline is not reflected here.

(Source: Department of State)

GULF OIL EXPORTS VIA PIPELINE AND STRAIT OF HORMUZ

(mbd)

| | 1985 | 1987 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Gulf Oil Exports | 8.16 | 9.4 | 11.2-12.4 | 15.3-16.9 | 14.9-16.9 |
| Via Pipeline | (1.76) | (4.0) | (7.0) | (9.0) | (10.0) |
| Via Strait | (6.4) | (5.4) | (4.2-5.4) | (6.3-7.4) | (4.9-6.9) |
| % Via Pipeline | 21.6% | 42.6% | 62.4-56.5% | 58.8-53.3% | 66.7-59.2% |
| % Via Strait | 78.4% | 57.4% | 37.6-43.5% | 41.2-46.7% | 33.3-40.8% |

Since 1973, the proportion of Gulf oil exported by pipeline has been increasing, primarily due to the effect of the Iran-Iraq war on Iraq's ability to ship through the Gulf. The following chart shows the dramatic increase in pipeline exports over the past decade:

PROPORTION OF GULF COUNTRY EXPORTS BY PIPELINE

| | 1978 | 1979 | 1981 | 1983 | 1985 | 1987 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vol. (mbd) | 0.25 | 0.8 | 1.05 | 1.3 | 1.76 | 4.0 |
| % | 1.3% | 4% | 7% | 13% | 22% | 42.6% |

The current capacity of the Gulf pipelines is 4.0 mbd; or 42.6% of total Gulf oil exports. Planning or construction is now underway on new pipelines which would add 1.7 mbd to current capacity. However, pipelines with a capacity of 2.2 mbd are currently shut down for technical or political reasons.

The International Energy Agency estimates that within approximately five years, 50% of Gulf oil could be exported by pipeline. European imports of Gulf oil are more and more likely to be those transitting pipelines to the Red Sea or Mediterranean ports. By contrast, over half of the oil transitting the Strait of Hormuz in recent times was headed for the Asia/Pacific region. It is likely that the dominance of that region as the principal customer for Hormuz oil will continue.

(Source: International Energy Agency, March 1987)

WORLD OIL RESERVES

(billions of barrels)

| | 1980 | 1985 | 1986 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Communist | 86.3 | 84.1 | 81.3 |
| Non-Communist | 562.2 | 614.6 | 618.8 |
| Middle East * | (361.0) | (397.6) | (397.3) |
| Total World Oil Reserves: | 648.5 | 698.7 | 700.1 |

* Middle East: GCC nations, Iran, Iraq and Syria. In 1986, Syrian reserves were 1.4 billion barrels. Saudi Arabia has the most oil reserves with 168 billion barrels in 1986; Kuwait is second with 90 billion barrels.

(Source: International Petroleum Encyclopedia)

CRUDE OIL PRICES

(per barrel)

| | OPEC official sale price | World price |
|---|---|---|
| 1984 average | $28.70 | N/A |
| 1985 average | $28.14 | $27.16 |
| 1986 average | $23.49 | $15.35 |
| 1987 average | $18.00 | $17.40 |

(Source: CIA International Energy Statistical Review, 26 May 1987

## APPENDIX B

### SELECTED MILITARY DATA

(Source: The Military Balance 1986-1987, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London)

BELLIGERENTS

**Iran**

Total Armed Forces: 704,500 regulars
350,000 Army reserves (ex-service volunteers)

**Army:** 305,000

3 mechanized divisions
(each with 3 brigades or 9 armored, 18 mechanized battalions)

7 infantry divisions

1 Special Forces division (4 brigades)

12 SAM battalions with HAWK

**Revolutionary Guard Corps:** 350,000 (still independent of the Army)

Perhaps 8 divisions and many independent brigades (which may include infantry, armored, paratroop, artillery, engineer, air defense and border defense units) are serving independently or with the Army and Navy elements.

**Navy:** 14,500

Destroyers: 2 US Sumner class
1 British Battle class with 2 quad Standard surface-to-surface missile and
1 quad Seacat surface-to-air missile launchers

Frigates: 4 Saam class (possibly 2 non-operational) with 1 quintuple Seakiller surface-to-surface missile and 1 triple Seacat SAM launcher

Corvettes: 2 US PF-103

Fast Attack Craft (Missile): 8 Kaman (La Combattante II) class (3 possibly serviceable) with a total of 7 Harpoon surface-to-surface missile launchers

Large Patrol Craft: 3 improved PGM-71
4 Cape class
2 BH-7 hovercraft (possible)

Marines: 3 battalions

Maritime Reconnaissance: 1 squadron with 2 P-3F (possibly non-operational)

**Air Force:** 35,000; perhaps 68 serviceable combat aircraft

Fighter-Ground Attack: 8 Squadrons
4 with some 35 (20 possibly serviceable) McDonnell-Douglas F-4D/E
4 with some 45 (30 possibly serviceable) Northrop F-5E/F

Interceptor/Fighter: (10 possible) Grumman F-14

Reconnaissance: 1 squadron (detachments) with some 5 F-14 and 3 RF-4E

Tanker/Transport: 2 squadrons with 17 Boeing (10 707 and 7 747 aircraft)

SAM: 5 squadrons with Rapier and 25 Tigercat fire units

**Iraq**

Total Armed Forces: 845,000

**Army:** 800,000

5 armored divisions (typically 1 armored and 1 mechanized brigade each)

3 mechanized/motorized infantry divisions

10 infantry divisions

1 Presidential Guard Force (3 armored, 1 infantry, 1 commando brigade)

2 Special Forces divisions (6 brigades)

9 Reserve brigades

15 Peoples' Army/volunteer infantry brigades

Army Air Corps: (40 possible) Mil M-24 Hind, 50 SA-342 Gazelle (some with HOT), 10 SA-321 Super Frelon (some with Exocet), some 30 SA-316B Alouette III with AS-12, some 44 MBB BO-105 with SS-11 anti-tank missiles

SAM: 120 SA-2, 150 SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-9, 60 Roland

**Navy:** 5,000

Frigates: 1 Lupo class with 8 Otomat-2 surface-to-surface missile and 1 octuple Albatros/Aspid SAM launchers, 1 helicopter
1 Yug class (training)

Corvettes: 6 (5 possible) Assad class with 1 quad Albatros/Aspid SAM launcher
2 with 2 Otomat-2 SSM launchers, 1 helicopter
4 with 6 Otomat-2 launchers

Fast Attack Craft (Missile): 10 Osa class with 4 Styx surface-to-surface missile launchers

Fast Attack Craft (Torpedo): 5 P-6

Large Patrol Craft: 3 SO-1

Coastal Patrol Craft: 8 including Poluchat, Nyryat II, PO-2, and Zhuk

**Air Force:** 40,000, some 500 combat aircraft

Bomber: 1 squadron with 7 Tupolev Tu-22
1 squadron with 8 Tupolev Tu-16

Fighter-Ground Attack: 11 squadrons
4 with some 40 MiG-23BM
4 with 20 Mirage F-1EQ5 (Exocet-equipped) and 23 Mirage F-1EQ-200
3 with Sukhoi Su-7 and Su-20.

Interceptors: 5 squadrons with some 25 MiG-25, some 40 MiG-19, some 200 MiG-21, and 30 Mirage F-1EQ

Reconnaissance: 1 squadron with 25 MiG-25

GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

**Bahrain**

Total Armed Forces: 2,800

**Army:** 2,300

1 infantry battalion
1 armored car squadron
1 artillery, 2 mortar batteries

**Navy:** 300

Fast Attack Craft (Missile): 2 Luerssen 45 meter boats with 4 Exocet surface-to-surface missile launchers

Fast Attack Craft: 2 Luerssen 38 meter boats

**Air Force:** 200

Fighter-Ground Attack: 1 squadron with 6 F-5Es

Helicopter: 1 squadron with 10 Agusta-Bell AB-212, 3 MBB BO-105, 2 Hughes 500D.

**Kuwait**

Total Armed Forces: 12,000

**Army:** 10,000

2 armored brigades
1 mechanized infantry brigade
1 surface-to-surface missile battalion

**Navy:** 1,100

Fast Attack Craft (Missile): 6 Luerssen TNC 45 with 4 Exocet launchers

Fast Attack Craft: 2 Luerssen FPB-57

Patrol Craft: 50 coastal (15 armed)

**Air Force:** 2,000, 80 combat aircraft, 23 armed helicopters

Fighter-Ground Attack: 2 squadrons with 30 A-4KU, 4 TA-4KU Skyhawk

Interceptor: 1 squadron with 32 Mirage F-1CK, 2 F-1BK

Counter-insurgency/Training: 1 squadron with 12 BAe Hawk

Helicopters: 3 squadrons
Attack: 23 SA-342K Gazelle
Transport: 12 SA-330 Puma, 5 AS-332 Super Puma

**Oman**

Total Armed Forces: 21,500

**Army:** 16,500

1 armored regiment (2 tank squadrons and 1 self-propelled artillery battery)
3 artillery regiments
1 reconnaissance regiment (2 armored car squadrons)
8 infantry regiments (battalions)
1 signals regiment
1 field engineer regiment
1 parachute regiment

**Navy:** 2,000

Fast Attack Craft (Missile): 3 Province class (2 with 2 quadruple, 1 with 2 triple Exocet launchers)
1 Brook Marine with 2 Exocet launchers

Fast Attack Craft: 4 Al-Wafi class

Patrol Craft: 4 inshore

**Air Force:** 3,000; 52 combat aircraft

Fighter-Ground Attack: 2 squadrons with 20 Sepecat Jaguar S(O) Mk.1 and 4 T-2

Fighter-Ground Attack/Reconnaissance: 1 squadron with 12 BAe Hunter FGA-73 and 4 T-7

Counter-insurgency/Training: 1 squadron with 12 BAC-167 Strikemaster MK-82

Air Defense: 2 squadrons with 28 Rapier fire units

**Qatar**

Total Armed Forces: 6,000

**Army:** 5,000

1 Royal Guard regiment
1 tank battalion
3 infantry battalions
1 artillery battery
1 SAM battery with Rapier

**Navy:** 700

Fast Attack Craft (Missile): 3 La Combattante IIIB class with 8 Exocet launchers

Patrol Craft: 6 Vosper Thornycraft 120-ton

Coast Defense: 3 Exocet MM-40

**Air Force:** 300, 23 combat aircraft, 2 armed helicopters

Fighter-Ground Attack: 14 Mirage F-1, 2 BAe Hunter FGA-6, 1 BAe Hunter T-79, and 6 Breguet-Dornier Alphajet

Helicopters: 2 SA-341 Gazelle, 20 Westland (3 Whirlwind, 4 Commando MK-2A, 10 MK-2B, and 3 Lynx)

**Saudi Arabia**

Total Armed Forces: 67,500

**Army:** 40,000

2 armored brigades
4 mechanized brigades
1 infantry brigades
1 Airborne brigade (2 parachute battalions, 3 special forces companies)
1 Royal Guard regiment (3 battalions)
5 artillery battalions
18 anti-aircraft artillery batteries
17 SAM batteries
12 with 105 I-HAWK fire units (216 missiles)
3 with 12 Shahine fire units (48 missiles) and AMX-30SA 30 mm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns

**Navy:** 3,500: 20 combat helicopters

Frigates: 4 F-200 with 8 Otomat-2 surface-to-surface missile and 1 Crotale SAM launchers, 1 AS-365 helicopter

Corvettes: 4 PCG-1 with 2 quad RGM-84A Harpoon surface-to-surface missile launchers

Fast Attack Craft (Missile): 9 PGG-1 with 2 twin Harpoon launchers

Fast Attack Craft (Torpedo): 3 Jaguar (Luerssen)

Large Patrol Craft: 1 (100 ton)

Coastal Patrol Craft: 45

Mine Counter-measures: 4 MSC-322 coastal boats

Helicopters: 24 AS-365N Dauphin 2 (4 SAR, 20 with AS-15TT air-to-surface missiles)

**Air Force:** 14,000; 216 combat aircraft

Fighter-Ground Attack: 3 squadrons with 65 Northrop F-5E

Interceptor: 3 squadrons (1 forming) with 45 F-15C

Reconnaissance: 1 squadron with 10 RF-5E

Operational Conversion Units: 2 with 24 F-5F, 16 F-5B, and 17 TF-15D

Air Defense: 2 batteries Shahine (Crotale) and 10 batteries Improved Hawk

**United Arab Emirates**

Total Armed Forces: 43,000

**Army:** 40,000

1 Royal Guard "brigade"
1 armored brigade
1 mechanized infantry brigade
2 infantry brigades
1 artillery, 1 Air Defense brigade (each 3 battalions)

**Navy:** 1,500

Fast Attack Craft (Missile): 6 Luerssen TNC-45 with twin Exocet launchers

Patrol Craft: 6 Vosper Thornycraft large
3 Keith Nelson coastal

**Air Force:** 1,500

Interceptor: 2 squadrons of 24 Mirage 5AD, 3, 5RAD, 5DAD

Fighter-Ground Attack: 1 squadron with 3 Breguet-Dornier Alphajet

Counter-insurgency: 1 squadron of 8 Aermacchi MB-326 KD/LD

Helicopters: 7 SA-316 Alouette III with AS-11, 8 Agusta Bell AB-205, 6 AB-206, 3 AB-212, 3 Bell 214, 9 SA-330 Puma, 6 AS-332F Super Puma, and 10 SA-342 Gazelle

# APPENDIX C

## Trip Participants

*Members*

Senator John Glenn, Ohio.
Senator John W. Warner, Virginia.

*Senate Staff*

Mr. Milton Beach, Defense Legislative Assistant for Senator Glenn.
Ms. Pat Buckheit, Foreign Policy Legislative Assistant for Senator Glenn.
Mr. Richard C. D'Amato, Council and Deputy Staff Director, Foreign and Defense Policy, Democratic Policy Committee.
Mr. James R. Locher, III, Professional Staff Member, Armed Services Committee.
Mr. Gorden G. Riggle, Professional Staff Member, Armed Services Committee.
Mr. Mark B. Robinson, Professional Staff Member, Armed Services Committee.
Mr. Carl M. Smith, Staff Director for the Minority, Armed Services Committee.

*Department of State*

Ms. Barbara Bodine, Deputy Director for Arabian Peninsula Affairs.

*Navy Department*

Captain John Chernesky, USN, Escort Officer.

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